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Abstract: This article examines government agencies facing choice architectures that are multiple, overlapping, ambiguous, 
and sometimes incompatible—in short: turbulent. It makes two contributions: First, two conceptual images of agency 
governance are outlined that derive distinct predictions on how agencies are likely to maneuver when embedded in integrated 
multilevel administrative orders. Secondly, benefitting from a large-N dataset on agency officials (N = 1,963) from 47 
government agencies, the study suggests that government agencies are primarily biased towards a pragmatist compound 
dynamic. Additionally, the analysis probes the robustness of these conceptual images by entering moderator variables into the 
analysis. Multiplicative interaction model analysis suggests that the compound dynamic of agency governance is robust because 
no moderator variables fundamentally transform relationships from one governance type to another.
Evidence for Practice
• Public governance is characterized by robustness and thus not likely to face fundamental shifts.
• This is the case even when government officials face choice architectures that are turbulent.
• The pragmatic compromises civil servants make when navigating everyday affairs are mediated through, and 
conditioned by, preexisting institutions, practices, and traditions.
• How government agencies navigate conflicting concerns is particularly affected by structural factors such 
as organizational duplication vis-à-vis ministerial departments and formal rules, but also established trust-
relationships.
Government agencies are a vital component of the core executive of states (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990; Orren and Skowronek 2017; 
Vibert 2007). In recent decades, however, agency 
governance has sustained significant transformation, 
notably through administrative integration across 
levels of governance (Egeberg 2006; Jacobsson et al. 
2015). National agencies are portrayed as being part 
of both national and federal (e.g., European) politico-
administrative orders. In consequence, they are faced 
with choice architectures that are multiple, overlapping, 
ambiguous, and sometimes incompatible—in 
short: turbulent (Ansell et al. 2017, 1; Easton 1965; 
Gunnell 2011; Miller 1971). Turbulence challenges 
conventional wisdom on the conditions for agency 
governance in situations where events, demands, 
and support interact and change in highly variable, 
inconsistent, unexpected, or unpredictable ways (Ansell 
and Trondal 2018). Subsequently, turbulence creates novel 
dilemmas for public organizations and are likely to push 
government agencies to make difficult tradeoffs, pulling 
them in contradictory, even paradoxical, directions.
What choices do government agencies make 
when subject to contending influences on how to 
maneuver? How do government officials choose 
when embedded in what Woodrow Wilson (1887, 
221) described as “systems within systems” that 
provide conflictual premises for choice? Traditionally, 
public administration has been seen as based upon a 
series of dichotomies: politics versus administration, 
coordination versus fragmentation, integration versus 
disintegration, trust versus distrust, loose versus 
tight coupling, etc. (Egeberg and Trondal 2016; 
Olsen 2008; Orton and Weick 1990; Trein et al. 
2020). In contrast, this article conceptualizes and 
empirically demonstrates how government agencies 
are driven by a pragmatist compound dynamic 
characterized by the co-existence of multiple 
premises and seemingly incompatible dilemmas 
(Ansell and Trondal 2018). The study makes two key 
contributions:
• First, it outlines two complementary conceptual 
images of agency governance: a conventional 
dyadic approach that offers a “zero-sum” 
conjecture that public administration runs 
in dichotomous domains, and secondly a 
compound approach suggesting that public 
governance is “positive-sum” in which agency  
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officials evoke compound behavior, characterized by the 
co-existence of multiple premises and seemingly incompatible 
dilemmas. These images, moreover, derive distinct propositions 
as to how government agencies are likely to maneuver when 
embedded in integrated multilevel administrative orders 
such as the European Union (EU). The article also suggests 
conditions that may bias these conceptual images.
• Secondly, the empirical validity and robustness of these 
conceptual images are tested on a novel large-N survey dataset 
(N = 1,963) on agency officials embedded in two parallel 
politico-administrative systems: the central administration of 
a unitary state (Norway) and the administrative system of a 
quasi-federal order (the EU). The study applies a comprehensive 
dataset consisting of 47 government agencies tasked with, 
amongst others, regulating and implementing public policy. The 
analysis demonstrates that agency officials feature pragmatist 
compound behavior characterized by compromises and abilities 
to navigate conflicting concerns—such as those of domestic 
governments and EU-level institutions. Secondly, the analysis 
probes the robustness of these conceptual images by entering 
moderator variables. Multiplicative interaction model analysis 
suggests that this dilemma is mediated through, and conditioned 
by pre-existing institutions, practices, and traditions (e.g., Bauer 
and Trondal 2015; Olsen 2008). However, this analysis suggests 
that the compound image of agency governance is robust since 
no moderator variables fundamentally transform relationships 
from one governance type to another.
Agency governance in integrated administrative systems calls upon 
agency officials to choose or balance competing concerns from 
different institutions. Integrated administrative systems produce 
ambiguity about what problems, solutions, and consequences 
to attend to at any time, and what actors are deemed legitimate 
and efficient (Ansell, Trondal, and Ogard 2017; Schmidt 2018). 
Agency officials who are engaged in two parallel domains of 
executive governance may experience opportunities and constraints 
because different institutions send different information, signals, 
and mandates (Dehousse 2008; Egeberg and Jarle 2018). The 
article thus contributes to a mounting literature on the changing 
role of public governance in an integrated multilevel European 
executive order (Bauer and Trondal 2015; Goetz and Meyer-
Sahlin 2008; Heidbreder 2011; Hofmann 2008; Trondal 2010). 
This literature has been preoccupied with understanding emergence 
and design of EU-level agencies (Christensen and Nielsen 2010; 
David 2011; Egeberg and Jarle 2017; Groenleer 2009; Rittberger and 
Wonka 2011), the interconnected nature of EU-level and national-
level agencies (Bach and Ruffing 2018; Curtin and Egeberg 2008; 
Egeberg and Jarle 2018; Maggetti 2014; Trein and Maggetti 2018), 
and implications on agency autonomy in the policy formulation 
process (Bach and Ruffing 2013; Bach, Ruffing, and Yesilkagit 2015) 
and policy implementation (Egeberg and Trondal 2009). This 
literature has so far described how the European administrative 
system represents a multilevel and nested network administration 
(e.g., Bach and Ruffing 2018) where administrative bodies at different 
levels of government “are linked together in the performance of tasks 
[…]” (Hofmann and Turk 2006, 583).
Studying how domestic government agencies adapt to the EU is 
important for two reasons. First, domestic public administration is 
crucial to the implementation and practicing of EU jurisprudence 
(Egeberg and Trondal 2009). Because the transposition of EU 
law remains an administrative process relatively isolated from 
political actors, it is essential to understand the prospects of 
uniform implementation of federal (EU) law by agencies. Secondly, 
domestic decision-making processes are crucial parts of federal 
policy-making since they are intertwined with the multilevel 
choice architectures of the EU, notably the European Commission 
and EU agencies (e.g., Groenleer 2009). However, one challenge 
plaguing contemporary scholarship is how to understand the role 
of public agencies in the governing of a deeply integrated (yet 
differentiated) EU multilevel system. A recent review of EU agency 
literature (Egeberg and Jarle 2017) argued that few studies have 
examined how agencification at one level of governance affects 
public governance at another, and thus how shifting features of 
the state, such as agencification and subsequent networking of 
agencies, influence democratic governance (but see Danielsen 
and Yesilkagit 2014; Egeberg 2006; Egeberg and Trondal 2016; 
Vantaggiato 2019; Verhoest et al. 2012). Whereas existing literature 
has mapped patterns of agencification, less is known of the actual 
role of national agencies in the multilevel policy-making process 
in the EU generally, and how they navigate in conflicting choice 
architectures—such as those of domestic governments and EU-level 
institutions. This study offers a novel contribution to this diverse 
literature by examining how domestic agency officials maneuver in a 
multilevel European administrative order.
The study proceeds as follows: The next section outlines a 
conceptual framework for analysis and propositions for empirical 
enquiry. The subsequent sections include data and methodology as 
well as an empirical analysis. The concluding discussion summarizes 
key findings and reflects on their wider implications to this body of 
literature.
A Two-Step Conceptual Framework
This section proceeds in two steps. The first step outlines conceptual 
images of agency governance: a dyadic and a compound approach. 
The second step suggests how moderator variables might bias agency 
governance towards either of the two. Organizationally, government 
agencies represent vertical fragmentation of polity and a supply 
of administrative capacities to solve regulatory challenges (Bach, 
Ruffing, and Yesilkagit 2015). They are organizational compromises 
that balance the need for political steering, professional autonomy, 
and technical regulation (Christensen and Nielsen 2010). 
Organizing government agencies at arm’s length from their parent 
ministries allows them to operate relatively insulated from political 
steering, yet it also makes them more exposed to “capture” from 
EU-level institutions and processes (Egeberg and Jarle 2017). The 
latter implies that EU-level institutions employ national agencies 
in the policy processes, for example by involving them directly 
into policy formulation and policy implementation (“direct” 
administration). This section derives two conceptual images of 
agency governance that derive distinct predictions on how agencies 
are likely to maneuver when embedded in integrated multilevel 
administrative orders.
Step I: Conceptual Images of Agency Governance
This section expands on two ideas from public administration 
literature that make distinctive forecasts for agency governance.
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Image I: A dyadic image of agency governance builds on the 
conventional “zero-sum” conjecture that public administration 
is based upon a series of dichotomies, such as politics versus 
administration, coordination versus fragmentation, and integration 
versus disintegration (Ansell and Trondal 2018; Cohen, March, and 
Olsen 1972; Egeberg and Trondal 2016; Orton and Weick 1990; 
Rosenau 1990; Waldo 1952; Wilson 1887, 221). Turbulence, 
hybridity, and ambiguity are thus understood to be dysfunctional 
to governance—that is, as exceptional, dangerous, or contradictory 
(Ansell, Trondal, and Ogard 2017). In this light, turbulence is 
seen to push organizations and institutions to their limits and 
threaten surprising cascading dynamics that undermine the 
sustainability of existing governance arrangements (Vigoda-Gadot 
and Mizrahi 2014). Or it might produce maladaptive behaviors that 
trap governance into suboptimal outcomes. From this perspective, 
the emphasis is generally not how governing institutions manage 
turbulence, but how they aim to withstand, stabilize, and/or 
ultimately solve it (Ansell and Trondal 2018).
This conceptual image builds on recent studies suggesting how 
agencies face incompatible coordination dilemmas in which 
competing demands undermine one another (Egeberg and 
Trondal 2016). The ambition of strong coordination of governance 
processes at one level of government is seen as incompatible with 
strong coordination of governance processes across levels. For 
example, strong steering of domestic agencies from the domestic 
political leadership is arguable adversely related with strong 
steering from the EU level. Strong coordination by the European 
Commission vis-à-vis domestic government agencies is expected 
to undermine ministerial political control. In general, Image I 
suggests how turbulence generates ambiguities in assessing “good” 
governance solutions (Grindle 2017) and highlights challenges 
attached to “nationally embedding a supranational project” since 
domestic agencies are unable to be strongly embedded both 
nationally and federally (e.g., supranationally) at the same time 
(Bulmer and Joseph 2016, 738).
In the same vein, Image I underscores how “better coordination” 
becomes difficult when public administration becomes embedded 
in multilevel structures. Recent administrative doctrines have 
shared a near-universal agreement on the desirability of “better 
coordination” and executive center formation (Lægreid et al. 2014). 
Image I, however, assumes that it is impossible to combine 
strong coordination processes at one level of government with 
simultaneous strong coordination across levels. The multilevel 
EU polity is a case in point: the EU relies heavily on “indirect 
administration” to implement policy within member-states and 
affiliated states, meaning that policy implementation is ultimately 
controlled by national political leadership and not by EU 
institutions. Effectively, this implies relatively weak coordination 
across levels, and stronger coordination within each level (e.g., 
nation–states). Conversely, poor national coordination may be a 
prerequisite for advancing the wider “European cause,” as evidenced 
for example by Wessels (1997). Poor national coordination is thus 
not merely a “management deficit” (Metcalfe 1994) but rather a 
requirement for coordination and steering across levels.
The tension between policy coordination across levels of 
government and national coordination has been well known in 
federal states and central–local relations within unitary states 
(Fossum and Jachtenfuchs 2017). It has been less recognized in the 
study of public administration. In this context, the coordination 
“dilemma” between and within levels of government emerges when 
national agencies become co-opted and employed as administrative 
infrastructure for EU bodies (Trondal and Guy Peters 2013). 
Consequently, national agencies may find themselves in situations 
where they are subject to conflicting demands and expectations 
from two different levels of government. Image I suggests that that 
agencies inevitably adopt to one side over the other. The following 
proposition is derived:
P1: Strong administrative integration across levels of governance 
makes national-level steering less likely, and so we expect significant 
negative correlations between EU-level and national-level 
coordination and steering.
Image II: A compound image of agency governance contends 
that public governance is “positive-sum” by involving multiple 
actors, co-evolving resources, governing logics, and dynamics 
(Olsen 2017; Trondal et al. 2010). Image II thus sees turbulence 
as a condition and an inherent trait of public governance, rather 
than a dysfunction (Ansell and Trondal 2018; Howlett and 
Mukherjee 2018). This image also sees governance processes as 
continuums rather than dichotomies. The general observation 
made by Ansell et al. (Ansell, Trondal, and Ogard 2017, 8) entails 
that turbulence can be “[an] almost a constitutive part of the 
institutional fabric” in organizational structures and cultures. A 
similar argument was made by Ljiphart (Lijphart 1968, 104), 
who characterized Dutch politics as consociational in which 
actors and institutions were “willing and capable of bridging the 
gaps between the mutually isolated blocs and of resolving serious 
disputes in a largely nonconsensual context.” Similar ideas linger in 
contemporary literature on differentiated European (dis)integration, 
in which differentiation is seen as a condition for EU governance 
(Fossum 2019a).
If embedded complexity and contestation is understood to be 
a condition of agency governance, one necessary implication 
is that efficient and effective governing institutions must 
manage turbulence as a condition for the policy process and 
tolerate ambiguity as part of the governing process (Orren and 
Skowronek 2017, 91). Public governance, consequently, must 
be analyzed on the basis of continuous rather than dichotomous 
variables (Ansell et al. Ansell, Trondal, and Ogard 2017). In this 
light, public administration has been pictured as hybrid and 
compound (Emery and Giauque 2014), reflecting how public 
administration often relates to larger political orders (Olsen 2018). 
The idea of the compound administration responds to calls for 
going beyond “the tyranny of dichotomies” and study “mixed 
political orders blending different forms of governance and 
organization” (Olsen 2008, 5,6). Public administration is engaged 
in co-evolving worlds of executive governance, for example when 
national agencies take on multiple roles or “hats” when practicing 
EU law (Egeberg and Jarle 2018). Similarly, a vast body of 
literature has pictured executive governance as characterized by the 
co-existence of institutions, decision-making dynamics, and levels of 
authority (Christensen and Lægreid 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2016; 
Mathieu and Rangoni 2019; Olsen 2007). Accordingly, public 
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administration faces complex and intertwined problems, solutions, 
actors, and decision-making arenas (Olsen 2007; Shapiro et al. 
Shapiro 2006). Domestic agencies’ handling of EU affairs is thus 
perhaps best conceptualized as compound processes in which they 
mobilize a multi-dimensional repertoire.
This idea follows a classical tradition in the study of public 
administration which argues that administrative systems tend to 
balance several competing concerns (e.g., Olsen 2007) and that 
public governance rests on the mobilization of multiple sets of 
institutions, resources, interests, values, norms, and cleavages of 
conflict (Pollitt 2016; Rokkan 1999). Cyert and March (1963), 
for example, suggest three institutional mechanisms for how a firm 
may cope with situations of turbulence: through local rationalities, 
through acceptable-level decision rules, and through sequential 
attention to goals. Moreover, Egeberg and Jarle (2018) emphasize 
that public governance is biased by the institutional structures of 
government. Translated to this context, it is assumed that problem-
solving by government agencies is influenced by their organizational 
design and “choice architectures,” ultimately biasing issue attention 
and prioritization (Bark and Bell 2019; Egeberg and Jarle 2018; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Thaler and Sunstein 2009). The 
compound structure of government agencies is thus likely to 
incite equally compound behavior, meaning that agency officials 
opt to pragmatically combine seemingly conflicting demands and 
concerns in their everyday affairs (Egeberg and Jarle 2018; Jann and 
Wegrich 2019). One general proposition follows:
P2: Strong administrative integration across levels of governance is 
not likely to undermine national-level steering but lead to agencies 
balancing the concerns of national and EU-level concerns, and so 
we expect significant positive correlations between EU-level and 
national-level coordination and steering.
Step II: Interaction Effects
This section suggests that the relative weight of conceptual Image I 
or II might be conditioned by intervening variables in which third 
variables affect the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables. Building on recent empirical studies in public governance 
literature (see Egeberg and Jarle 2018), this section specifies five 
variables that might intervene and bias agency governance towards 
either Image I or Image II.
(i) The degree to which policy fields are generally affected by the 
EU and the degree to which policy fields require cooperation 
across levels of governance: Depending on the policy field 
and sector, there is substantial variation in the degree to 
which national agencies are affected by EU institutions and 
policies that require cooperation across levels of governance. 
Moderator 1 assumes that exposure to EU-level rules, 
practices, and institutions may bias national agency officials’ 
perceptions in the importance of the relationship between 
national (dependent variable) and supranational (indepen-
dent variable) institutions.
(ii) Administrative capacity to ensure coordination and collabo-
ration between relevant actors: Sufficient administrative 
capacity indicates capacities to direct attention to public 
problems, solutions, actors, and decision-making arenas 
(Egeberg and Trondal 2016; Falkner et al. 2004; Knill and 
Hille 2006) both within and across levels of government. 
Moderator 2 assumes that limited administrative capacities 
is likely to bias attention towards the immediate environ-
ment of institutions (Simon 1957), which in this study 
is the national government apparatus, whereas sufficient 
administrative capacities ensures influence from a broader 
range of institutions, hereunder EU-level institutions. Ac-
cordingly, this may bias national agencies’ perceived impor-
tance of EU-level institutions.
(iii) The degree to which there are organizational overlaps between 
the agency and their parent ministry (organizational duplica-
tion): Studies have found that agencies are more influenced 
by their parent ministries when they have institutionalized 
overlapping positions, units, or departments (duplica-
tion) (Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Landau 1969; Verhoest 
et al. 2012). Ministries thereby become better equipped 
to monitor and discern ongoing activities in the agencies, 
pulling agencies closer to the political leadership and nar-
rowing their room for discretionary behavior. Moderator 3 
thus assumes that organizational duplication will intervene 
on the relationship between the dependent and indepen-
dent variables, biasing national agencies towards national 
politico-administrative institutions.
(iv) The degree to which there are clear and established formal rules 
on how to conduct tasks: Less formalized, loosely coupled 
decision-making premises are argued to increase flexibility 
and room for discretionary behavior (March and Olsen 
1976; Orton and Weick 1990). By contrast, national agen-
cies that are subject to clear and established formal rules at 
national level are likely to face weaker room of discretion. 
Moderator 4 suggests that agencies that are subject to weak 
and less established formal rules are likely to report strong 
attachments towards EU-level institutions.
(v) Perceived trust between own agency and parent ministry: Trust 
is, as Ruscio (1996, 461) points out, “central to legitimate 
democratic government, to the formation of public policy, 
and to its implementation.” Regarding trust in public in-
stitutions, the main argument for its pivotal relevance is its 
ability to ensure compliance without coercion, in particular 
in cases where enforcement mechanisms are restricted, and 
risks thus are involved (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; 
Scholz and Pinney 1995). Related to this study, moderator 
5 suggests that when trust-relationships are generally high 
between agencies and their parent ministry, agencies are less 
likely to report strong attachment towards EU-level institu-
tions.
Data and Methodology
The dataset covers by far the most integrated non-member of the 
EU (Norway). Like most core executives, the Norwegian central 
administration is organized into core-executive ministries and 
subordinated agencies. It thereby mirrors the EU administrative 
system consisting of horizontally specialized Directorates-General 
with subordinate agencies. The Norwegian central administration 
is characterized by ministerial primacy where subordinated agencies 
are subject to political control and administrative accountability 
from the responsible minister and not primarily from a government 
collegium. Whilst Norwegian ministries are secretariats for the 
political leadership with planning and coordinating functions 
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(Christensen and Lægreid 2008), agencies are mainly responsible 
for advising ministries and being technical helpers but are also 
essential ingredients in the political processes of preparing policies 
and implementing and administering policies. Norway is not a 
formal EU member but is closely affiliated through more than 70 
agreements, most notably the European Economic Area (EEA) 
agreement and the Schengen agreement (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; 
Fossum and Graver 2018). Through these agreements, Norway is 
granted privileged access to most parts of the EU administration,i 
which in turn largely opens for administrative integration on the 
same premises as formal EU member-states (Fossum 2019b). 
Consequently, despite a lack of political representation in the (EU) 
Council and the European Parliament, the Norwegian executive 
branch of government is tightly integrated with, and influenced by, 
the EU-level administrative institutions (Egeberg 2006; Kühn and 
Trondal 2018). Norway’s relationship with the EU may thus best 
be regarded as territorially dis-integrated but sectorally integrated, 
making Norway a generalizable case of administrative integration.
The study benefits from a unique large-N questionnaire survey that 
was recently (2016) completed at the agency level in the Norwegian 
central administration (N = 1,963 respondents in 47 agencies). 
One-third of the total population of agency officials were selected 
for the survey. This limitation was pragmatically made due to the 
extensive number of agency officials (approximately 16,400 in 
total). Moreover, the respondents were selected based on two main 
criteria: (a) they are “A-level” officials, implying that they have 
acquired a university degree, and (b) they have minimum one year 
of experience in their current position. The surveys were conducted 
as online surveys by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. The 
overall response rate is around 60 percent. The survey represents the 
most thorough screening of the Norwegian central administration, 
and probably one of the most comprehensive datasets on public 
governance in national government administrations worldwide (see 
also Geuijen et al. 2008). The questionnaire addresses a variety of 
aspects relating to, amongst others, the role and function of civil 
servants, distribution of power, patterns of contact, coordination, 
identification, and demographic backgrounds. Table 1 presents 
the independent and dependent variables of the study, including 
moderators. The empirical analysis applies importance of (various) 
institutions as measurement of the alleged steering dilemma. Two 
proxies are applied as dependent variables and two as independent 
variables.
To empirically evaluate and explore the theoretical propositions 
explicated above, we use a two-step procedure. First, we explore 
pairwise correlations within and across several variables clustered 
at both the national level and EU level. Interpreting bivariate 
correlations singularly does not suffice to evaluate whether agency 
governance is mainly dyadic or compound. In addition, one needs 
to look at the broader picture and assess patterns of correlations 
within and between levels simultaneously. As outlined in the 
theoretical section, strong positive bivariate correlations across levels 
of governance indicate compound agency governance. However, 
this inference will be weakened, or appear arbitrary, if similar 
correlation patterns are not consistent for other pairs of variables 
across levels, or even if variables within levels correlate negatively. 
Likewise, while strong negative correlations between variables across 
national and EU levels correspond with a dyadic pattern, such 
an inference is more convincing if these correlations coexist with 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics: Dependent, Independent, and Moderator Variables*
N** Value - Max. Value - Min. Value - Do not know Mean*** St.dev.***
Dependent variables
Importance of parent ministry when central decisions 
within your policy field are being made
1,178 (1,233) 1 – Very important 5 – Not important 6 – 55 1.7 1
Importance of government when central decisions in 
your policy field are made
1,035 (1,235) 1 – Very important 5 – Not important 6 – 200 2.1 1.2
Independent variables
Importance of the Commission when central 
decisions in your policy field are made
751 (1,236) 1 – Very important 5 – Not important 6 – 485 3.2 1.3
Importance of EU agencies when central decisions in 
your policy field are made
670 (1,234) 1 – Very important 5 – Not important 6 – 564 3.5 1.3
Moderators
Degree to which own policy field is affected by EU/
EEA/Schengen
1,374 1 – To a very large 
extent
5 – Not affected – 3.2 1.5
Administrative capacity to ensure coordination and 
collaboration between relevant actors
1,536 (1,686) 1 – Very good 5 – Very poor 6 – 150 2.6 0.9
Degree to which there are clear and established 
formal rules on how to conduct tasks****
1,722 (–) 1 – Very clear rules 5 – Rely on own 
judgement to a 
very large extent
– 2.6 1.1
Organizational duplication***** 1,462 1 –Departments 4 – No organizational 
duplication
– 2.2 1.1
Perceived trust between own agency and parent 
ministry
1,169 (1,240) 1 – Very high 5 – Very poor 6 – 71 1.9 0.8
Degree of politicization of own policy field 1,232 1 – To a very large 
extent
5 – To a very small 
extent
– 2.7 1.2
*Missing values not included.
**Includes only values 1–5 (includes value 6 in parenthesis).
***Includes only value 1–5.
****This variable is 5-scaled: (1) very large degree of formal rules, (2) large degree of formal rules, (3) neutral, (4) rely on own judgement to a fairly large extent, and (5) 
rely on own judgement to a very large extent.
*****This variable is 4-scaled: (1) departments, (2) sections, (3) positions, and (4) no organizational duplication.
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positive within-level correlations. If, on the other hand, correlations 
both within and across levels are strongly negative, the results would 
be indeterminate in supporting the regularity of a dyadic pattern. 
Table 2 illustrates this complexity and thus the need to look at 
broader patterns of correlations. More particularly, table 2 maps 
four patterns of pairwise correlations between variables within and 
across levels, of which two accentuate the ideal-type patterns for 
compound and dyadic governance, respectively.
A clear compound governance pattern thus emerges where positive 
correlations are visible both across and within levels. In a similar 
vein, a clear dyadic pattern becomes visible when correlations across 
levels are consistently negative whilst correlations within levels 
are predominantly positive. Unfortunately, the terrain does not 
always fit the map. The complexity of interpreting correlational 
patterns thus increases with the emergence of low or non-significant 
correlations, within and/or across levels. In such instances, it 
becomes difficult to determine if a hypothesized strong correlation 
combined with low or no correlation are pointing towards 
compound or dyadic tendencies.
One way of taking this complexity into account is to assess the 
dynamic and conditional nature of agency governance within the 
confines of a regression analysis. The next step is thus to explore the 
relationship between national-level and EU-level variables using a 
classic multiplicative interaction model as a framework for the analysis:
 Y X Z XZ         0  
Following the advice of Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), 
all constitutive terms are included in the model alongside the 
interaction term. The outcome variable Y is the perceived 
importance of institutions at the national level, while the key 
independent variable X is perceived importance of EU-level 
institutions. The moderator variable Z is included to investigate 
whether, or to what extent, the strength and/or direction of the 
relationship between X and Y is conditional, that is, varies with 
the level of Z. In other words, a multiplicative interaction model 
enables us to explore whether compound or dyadic tendencies 
may emerge under different institutional contexts, or, alternatively, 
whether a relationship is stable across various conditions or contexts. 
As such, the aim of the analysis is not to explain as much variance 
as possible but rather to investigate and reveal conditions under 
which a relationship between an outcome and an independent 
variable unfolds. Caution is thus warranted when interpreting the 
coefficients of the independent variables, in terms of both effect 
sizes and statistical significance. That statistical significance does 
not equate to substantive significance (Bernardi, Chakaia, and 
Leopold 2017; Ziliak and McCloskey 2008) is especially the case 
when evaluating conditional hypotheses. A coefficient, significant 
or not, only captures the effect of X on Y when Z is zero. As the 
effect size and its significance vary across levels of the moderator 
Z, the coefficients must not be misinterpreted as unconditional 
marginal effects. To examine the conditional nature of the effects, 
the interactions effects will be plotted graphically for illustrative and 
interpretative purposes.
When using survey questionnaire as a method for collecting data 
from the same respondent on both the dependent and independent 
variables, there is also the risk that common method variance 
(CMV) will bias the results of empirical analysis (Jakobsen and 
Jensen 2015). Estimated effects may be inflated, or deflated, due to 
systematic variance shared among the variables. While bivariate linear 
relationships are more prone to being influenced by CMV, it is less 
of an issue in more complex regression models involving multiple 
independent variables and particularly interaction effects. The 
presence of CMV cannot create interaction effects, only attenuate 
them (Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010). As such, “empirical 
researchers should not be criticized for CMV if the main purpose 
of their study is to establish interaction effects,” and, if anything, 
“finding significant interaction effects despite the influence of CMV 
in the data set should be taken as strong evidence that an interaction 
effect exists” (Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010, 470). Although not 
being conclusive, a Harman single-factor test was conducted to detect 
whether, or to what extent, variance in the data can be attributed to 
a single factor (Thesen et al. Tehseen, Ramayah, and Sajilan 2017). 
The test revealed a first factor capturing only 22 percent of the total 
variance, and a total of 28 factors with an eigenvalue above 1, both of 
which suggest that CMV is not a pervasive issue.
Violating the homoskedasticity assumption of regression may 
invalidate statistical inferences by increasing the risk of making a type 
1 error (Hayes and Cai 2007). Since a Breusch–Pagan test revealed the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in the error terms, a heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard error (HCSE) estimator was used in estimating 
the OLS regression parameters. In practice, this makes it more 
difficult for the coefficients to pass the significance test.
National Agencies in a Dual Administrative System: Choose 
One or Do Both?
Table 3 makes a test of whether agency governance is mainly dyadic 
or compound by studying bivariate correlations between ascribed 
importance to various institutions at the national and at the EU 
level. Three observations are made: First, we find strong, positive, 
and significant correlations between the ascribed importance of 
EU-level institutions, with all the correlations being well above 
0.700. Not surprisingly, the highest correlation in this group is 
between political institutions at the EU level, namely the European 
Parliament and the (EU) Council (correlation of 0.918). Secondly, 
we also find strong, positive, and significant correlations between 
ascribed importance of institutions at the national level, albeit not 
as high as in the EU-level cluster. Among national-level institutions, 
the correlation between the government and the national parliament 
stands out as highest (correlation of 0.841). This is followed by 
TABLE 2 Patterns of Pairwise Correlations
Compound Indeterminate Dyadic Indeterminate
1 2 3 4
Within-level correlation Positive Negative Positive Negative
Across-level correlation Positive Positive Negative Negative
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TABLE 3 Inter-correlation Matrix on the Importance of Institutions. Pearson’s r
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. Own organization 1
2. Parent ministry 0.458** 1
3. Other ministries 0.218** 0.329** 1
4. National Parliament 0.238** 0.494** 0.309** 1
5. Government 0.238** 0.533** 0.335** 0.841** 1
6. EU Commission 0.030 0.093* 0.124** 0.196** 0.142** 1
7. EU agencies 0.015 0.079 0.103** 0.151** 0.116** 0.770** 1
8. EU Council 0.037 0.176** 0.159** 0.264** 0.214** 0.801** 0.799** 1
9. EU Parliament 0.026 0.160** 0.156** 0.245** 0.182** 0.767** 0.773** 0.918** 1
*Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
**Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
correlation between the government and parent ministry at 0.533. 
The remaining correlations in this group are also fairly high, ranging 
from 0.218 to 0.494. If anything, one surprise might be that these 
correlations are not even stronger. Third and most importantly, the 
last set of correlations are those across level of governance. Overall, 
significant correlations are lower than in the two previous groups, 
yet most are positive and significant. The highest correlation found 
is between ascribed importance of the national parliament and the 
Council (0.264). Most of the remaining correlations are significant 
and positive, yet moderate.
In sum, we may draw two inferences: First, there are relatively 
strong positive correlations between ascribing importance to 
institutions at the same level of governance. This relationship 
is strongest when it comes to EU-level institutions. Moreover, 
at the national level, agency officials who ascribe importance to 
own organization are most likely to ascribe importance to own 
parent ministry while other ministries and political institutions are 
deemed less important. This observation is largely due to the fact 
that government agencies are organized at arm’s length from their 
parent ministries, entrusting agencies with room of maneuver from 
political steering. Such vertical specialization ensures that agencies 
are situated at relative distance from political institutions. Moreover, 
horizontal specialization ensures that agencies operating in different 
policy domains operate in relative isolation from one another. As 
a consequence, the parent ministry becomes the most important 
institution for a majority of agency officials. At the EU level, the 
distinction between administrative and political institutions is less 
clear to domestic agency officials, although the correlation between 
the Council and European Parliament stands out (0.918). The 
second conclusion we can draw is that while we observe relatively 
strong correlations within each level of government, we observe 
relatively lower cross-level correlations. Nonetheless, contrary to 
the conceptual model of Image I, the data do not demonstrate 
any adverse relationships between governance dynamics across 
levels. Agency officials may regard both domestic and European 
institutions as being of importance, yet it is more likely that 
they favor one set of institutions over the other. Translated into 
theoretical terms, table 3 is overall in accordance with conceptual 
Image II, although the insignificant and low cross-level correlation 
may arguably indicate moderate dyadic tendencies.
While table 3 serves as a starting point in the analysis of the alleged 
steering dilemma, the succeeding tables 4 to 7 examine conditions 
that might push agency officials towards dyadic or compound 
directions. Model 3 and 4 test the relationship between ascribed 
importance of own parent ministry (dependent variable 1) and the 
importance of three independent variables: the importance ascribed 
to the European Commission, the importance ascribed to EU 
agencies, and the degree to which own policy area is affected by EEA/
EU/Schengen (affectedness), with the list of moderators. Table 5 
and 6 test the relationship between the ascribed importance of the 
government (dependent variable 2) and the same list of independent 
variables and moderators. Each table contains six models in which we 
regress the independent variables on seven different moderators.
A first observation is that “affectedness” significantly moderates 
the impact of the independent variable, suggesting that the effect 
of the EU-level institutions on agency governance is contingent 
on the degree to which officials’ policy fields are affected by EU/
EEA/Schengen. Table 3 shows two significant interaction effects: 
Administrative capacity is significant, close to the 0.05 level (one-
tailed). Moreover, organizational duplication is significant at the 
0.05 level (two-tailed). From this we learn that the effect of the 
European Commission on the parent ministry is dependent on 
administrative capacity and organizational duplication. Similarly, 
the data reveal that organizational duplication renders significant 
interaction effects also in table 4, suggesting that the same holds 
true for the effect of EU agencies on the parent ministry. Table 5 
tests the relationship between the European Commission and 
the national government, revealing significant interaction effects 
of trust. This suggests that the effect of the Commission on the 
national government depends on significant trust-relationships 
between agencies and their parent ministry, which suggests that 
national-level trust-relationships within the government apparatus 
might be an important factor in understanding conditions for 
multilevel governance. The five remaining moderator variables 
show no significant effects. Lastly, table 6 reveals that the effect of 
EU agencies on the national government depends on formal rules 
and trust, albeit with the latter being merely significant at the 0.05 
level in a one-tailed test. Table 8 summarizes selected results by 
highlighting the significant moderating variables as found across 
the four main models, where two different dependent variables are 
regressed on two independent variables, respectively. As illustrated 
in table 8, tables 4 to 7 reveal four significant moderators. The 
moderating effect of affectedness is consistent across all models. In 
addition, organizational duplication, perceived trust, and formal 
rules are also significant moderators in one or more models.
Graphical plots are needed to further interpret the interaction 
effects. To illustrate and examine the conditional nature 
of agency governance, figures 1 to 4 plot the interaction 
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Figure 1 Relationship between Perceived Importance of the Commission and the Perceived Importance of Own Parent Ministry 
(Dependent Variable), with Interaction Effects.
TABLE 8 Summary of Findings*
Significant moderators across models
Dependent variables
Importance of parent ministry when central 
decisions within your policy field are 
being made
Importance of government when central 
decisions in your policy field are made
Independent variables Importance of EU Commission when central 
decisions in your policy field are made
Figure 1 Figure 3
a) Affectedness a) Affectedness
b) Duplication b) Percieved trust
Importance of EU agencies when central 
decisions in your policy field are made
Figure 2 Figure 4
a) Affectedness a) Affectedness
b) Duplication b) Formal rules
*Includes only two-tailed significant values.
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effects from tables 4 to 7. As the plotted lines in figures 1 to 
4 suggest, the relationship between the dependent variables 
and the independent variables varies across categories of the 
moderating variables. Each line represents the relationship 
within a category. Interactions occur whenever lines are not 
parallel. Lines that do not run parallel may indicate significant 
and thus important interactions in which a compound or dyadic 
tendency is amplified or muted. Moreover, if lines are cross-
cutting to the extent that they point in different directions, 
a relationship may change diametrically, from compound to 
dyadic (or vice versa) within the categories of the moderating 
variable. To be specific, a compound pattern is recognized by 
lines pointing upwards, which indicates a positive relationship, 
while lines pointing downwards reflect a negative relationship 
conforming to a dyadic pattern. Figures 1a and b are graphical 
illustrations of the moderating effects of affectedness and 
organizational duplication, respectively.
Figure 1a illustrates how the relationship between the 
importance ascribed to the parent ministry and the European 
Commission varies across the range of degrees in affectedness. 
Crossing lines illustrate a significant interaction effect. As the 
lines demonstrate, a more compound relationship emerges 
as affectedness decreases. And likewise, the compound image 
decreases as affectedness increases. From this we may infer that 
the effect of EU-level institutions is conditioned by the degree 
of affectedness. Figure 1b demonstrates the moderating effect 
of organizational duplication. While the interaction is less 
prominent, the lines illustrates that a compound pattern emerges 
as duplication increases. This indicates that increasing the degree 
Figure 2 Relationship between Perceived Importance of EU Agencies and the Perceived Importance of Own Parent Ministry 
(Dependent Variable), with Interaction Effects.
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of organizational duplication also increases the agencies’ ability 
to act according to a compound dynamic.
Figures 2a and b demonstrate that the previous findings are robust 
also on the perceived importance of EU agencies as dependent 
variable. Still, the interaction effects remain almost identical. As 
perceived affectedness increases, the relationship becomes less 
compound. And likewise, organizational duplication reinforces the 
compound pattern.
Although less evident, the moderating effect of affectedness 
remains identical when the dependent variable is changed to 
perceived importance of government: The compound pattern 
still decreases as affectedness increases. Another moderator that 
becomes significant is perceived trust between the own agency and 
the parent ministry. As the lines illustrates, a compound tendency 
becomes more evident as trust increases. Among those reporting 
lower levels of trust, the relationship weakens. This indicates that 
higher levels of trust between agencies and ministries increase the 
stronghold of Image II.
Finally, when plotting the relationship between perceived 
importance of EU agencies and the perceived importance of the 
government, the moderating effect of affectedness is still robust. The 
compound pattern becomes more evident as affectedness decreases. 
The fourth moderator that turns out to be significant is the degree 
to which agency officials report clear and formal rules on how to 
conduct tasks. In this context, a compound pattern is evident when 
Figure 3 Relationship between Perceived Importance of the Commission and the Perceived Importance of the Government 
(Dependent Variable), With Interaction Effects.
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clear and established rules are present. Where rules are established in 
the relationship, a compound tendency tends to diminish.
Discussion and Conclusion
If turbulence is a new normal for public administration and 
governance, we need analytical categories for understanding 
implications and possible responses. This study elaborates such an 
analytical framework and probes how government agencies tend 
to respond. Two response patterns are analyzed: a dyadic and a 
compound approach.
In situations of turbulence, governments may be faced with the 
choice of integration or disintegration. Governments may choose 
a strategy of managing turbulence through integration, such as 
incorporation of agencies into government ministries, or they may 
opt for differentiation by for example decentralizing power to 
agencies. At the extreme of integration, we expect unitary vertically 
integrated organizations with divisions, and as we move to the other 
extreme of the differentiation, we expect a proliferation of smaller 
specialized organizations. At both extremes, the logic is one of 
“pure types” of organizations, as captured by the dyadic approach 
to agency governance (Image I). Alternatively, under turbulent 
conditions we may expect government agencies to be pulled in both 
directions as characterized by the compound approach (Image II). 
The dilemma in this second approach might be addressed through 
hybrid strategies. Hybrid structures may combine components 
from various organizational forms or institutional logics, bridge 
across functional domains, or mix characteristics of state, market, 
and civil society (Ansell, Trondal, and Ogard 2017; Battilana and 
Lee 2014; Brandsen and Karré 2011; Minkoff 2002; Skelcher 
Figure 4 Relationship between Perceived Importance of EU agencies and Perceived Importance of the Government (Dependent 
Variable), with Interaction Effects.
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and Smith 2015). Hybridity helps to create structural flexibility 
necessary to respond to competing and varied demand. It takes 
advantage of the heterogeneity and pluralism of institutional 
environments (Kraatz and Block 2008), treating organizational 
forms as building blocks that can be combined in various ways 
(Battilana and Lee 2014).
Hybridity as a response to turbulence may be particularly 
important for addressing turbulence created by multilevel 
governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001) and the “wicked problems” 
it can produce (Conklin 2006). Hybrid organizations are often 
improvisational solutions to the governance dilemmas created by 
complex institutional ecologies (see Lægreid et al. 2014, 4), albeit 
only incomplete when government organizations are embedded 
in integrated administrative systems. Beyond structural measures 
and beyond the discussion of this study, hybrid solutions may be 
supported by softer measures, such as re-establishing “common 
ethics” and “cohesive cultures” in public governance (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2011). To be sustainable, hybrid organizations may 
forge common identity that transcends different logics or forms 
(Battilana and Dorado 2010).
This study has outlined a framework for analyzing agency governance 
in integrated administrative systems. Empirically, the data convey 
a hybrid pattern of compound agency governance processes under 
these conditions. Moreover, the compound image of agency 
governance is shown to be robust since no moderator variables are 
able to fundamentally change relationships from one governance 
type to another. The findings align with recent studies that have 
shown the compound roles of public agencies and their staff (e.g., 
Bach and Ruffing 2013; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2011; van Dorp 
and Hart 2019). Correspondingly, the observations in this study 
challenge the alleged dyadic coordination dilemma facing agencies 
embedded in multilevel structures. Moreover, the study suggests that 
four significant moderators influence agency governance consistently 
across all models (figures 1 to 4). The graphical plots also suggest that 
the effects of the moderator variables are similar for the Commission 
and EU agencies. In addition, organizational duplication, perceived 
trust, and formal rules were significant moderators in one or more 
models. However, whereas these moderators bias agency governance, 
neither of them fundamentally transform relationships from one 
governance type to another.
The affiliated status as an integrated EU non-member-state grants 
the Norwegian central administration privileged access to most 
parts of the EU administration, which in turn paves the way for 
deep administrative integration at agency level. This study suggests 
that agency-driven administrative integration across levels of 
governance mobilizes an administrative bias towards expert bodies, 
which may fuel an “administrative state” (Waldo 1952) more than 
a “policy state” (Orren and Skowronek 2017). Nonetheless, rather 
than a binary understanding of agency governance, this article 
demonstrates the hybrid nature of compound agency governance 
characterized by agencies making compromises and displaying skills 
to navigate conflicting concerns.
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